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Vital Spaces and Mental Health 
Abstract 
The impact of social and material conditions on mental health is well established 
but lacking in a coherent approach. We offer the concept of ‘vitality’ as means of 
describing how environments facilitate ‘feelings of being alive’ that cut across 
existing diagnostic categories. Drawing on the work of Daniel Stern, Thomas 
Fuchs, Frederic Worms and Cameron Duff we argue that vitality is not solely a 
quality of an individual body, but rather emerges from attunements and 
resonances between bodies and materials. We use vitality as a lens to explore 
how movements within and between assembled sets of relations can facilitate or 
disable feelings and expressions of being alive. Building upon extended 
discussions of both inpatient and community based mental health care, we 
sketch out a research agenda for analysing ‘vital spaces’. 
Keywords: vitalism; forms of vitality; assemblages; therapeutic landscapes; 
secure psychiatric care; community mental health; recovery 
I would say this place has amputated my sexuality. Definitely, it’s – it’s not 
my home, it’s not – it’s not a free environment and … it’s a – it’s so anti-
life. I just don’t even think about sexuality in here and I grieve over that 
quite a lot. And … I try and cope with this place on its own terms, you 
know and whatever it has to offer me I will engage with. So I try to make 
it a reality, its own reality but I still can’t feel human enough to be a sexual 
being in this environment. (Anne) 
Introduction 
  2 
Anne is a patient in a medium-secure forensic psychiatric unit. This is a hospital 
environment where patients are detained under a section of the UK Mental 
Health Act (i.e. ‘sectioned’) for an indefinite period of time. Patients like Anne are 
cared for within a ‘forensic’ pathway, meaning that they have been convicted of a 
criminal offence (referred to as an ‘index offence’). However their mental health 
issues are considered sufficiently severe to warrant treatment in a hospital 
rather than a prison setting. Medium-secure units have locked wards and other 
security measures. Patients here are under no illusion that they are formally 
considered to be a risk to themselves, to others, and to the environment itself. 
We talked to Anne (the name is a pseudonym) as part of a study on sexuality and 
intimate relationships in secure settings1. Her way of describing how the 
environment shaped her experiences was a revelation to us. We had expected 
that patients might be unhappy or feeling that their needs were not being met. 
We were aware that many patients experience unpleasant side-effects from the 
medication they are obliged to take, which can result in weight gain, restlessness 
and sexual dysfunction. This all contributes to significant issues with body image 
and self-esteem. But we did not anticipate hearing this framed in terms of vitality 
– of the tension between what Anne calls ‘life’ and ‘anti-life’. Anne’s comments 
have led us towards an exploration of the potential of vitality to serve as an 
alternative conceptual basis for understanding the relationship between mental 
health and the environment.  
Our aim in the paper can be simply stated: we want to do justice to Anne’s 
experiences by elaborating her distinction further. In doing so, we are not 
suggesting that her words need to be ‘theorised’ or translated into a 
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philosophical language. Anne is, in effect, an ‘expert by experience’, and we do 
not regard what she says as in any way lacking or as standing in need of 
qualification in an academic discourse. What we are proposing instead is to see 
her lived experience as a point of departure into a series of conceptual 
experiments that have the overall ambition of providing an enriched vocabulary 
for describing how environments are ‘anti-life’, and conversely how to think 
about those that support vitality. We will refer to both aspects of environments 
using the term ‘vital spaces’.  
What motivates these experiments is the desire to address the lack of systematic 
attention to the impact of social and material environments on mental health. It 
is well established that poverty, poor living conditions and social inequalities are 
key factors in increased levels of mental health issues2. But the dominant 
approaches to mental health in most Western nations remains wedded to an 
individualized and often biological model of causation and treatment3. Where 
environmental factors are considered, it is often as broader moderating 
variables, rather than as central issues. What is lacking is a holistic approach 
where the relationship between person and environment is not treated as 
dualism where the ‘outside’ enters into the ‘inside’ of the individual4. The 
promise of vitality as a concept is that it draws upon a rich tradition of thought 
that destabilizes dualisms of this kind. Life cannot be contained within any stable 
distinction between persons and the worlds they inhabit. It is inherently 
excessive as a term, provoking reflection on what we mean when we speak of 
bodies and health.  
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In what follows, we first offer a range of contemporary approaches to vitality in 
order to demonstrate the need to move beyond limiting person-environment 
distinctions. We then turn to the ‘critical vitalism’ of Frederic Worms to argue 
that ‘life’ and ‘anti-life’ are in a necessary tension with one another, and 
demonstrate how recognition of this tension reframes how we understand 
mental health. We then proceed to describe how person-environment relations 
can be grasped as ‘assemblages’, following the work of Cameron Duff. This is 
then contextualized in the case of both inpatient and community based mental 
health care. Finally, we offer the concept of ‘vital spaces’ as the basis for an 
agenda for studying mental health through a vitalist lens. As the paper develops, 
we shift from a conceptual language to an empirical focus on the specific 
material contexts in which vitality is experiences. This mirrors the tensions with 
vitality itself that Henri Bergson5 described – from thought to action, from 
experience to space. Any reflection upon vitality is, we argue, inevitably caught 
within these tensions. 
Conceptualising Vitality 
In Forms of Vitality, the clinician Daniel N. Stern offers a bold account of what he 
terms ‘the manifestation of life, of being alive’ (p.3)6. Vitality is, for Stern, 
effectively hidden in plain sight. In common sense terms, it is easy to recognise 
the experience of ‘feeling alive’, of feeling connected to the world around us and 
sensations of efficacy and the possessing capacities to act. But the precise status 
of vitality is more difficult to identify. Stern begins with the mundane 
observation that to feel alive is to feel that one is either in movement or poised to 
engage in some movement, that one’s body and mind are capable of action. 
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Movement then implies both a spatial and a temporal trajectory. Actions have a 
directionality, a patten that unfolds in its own space and time, and which has 
some implied object or objective, even if that is merely the expression of the 
body’s capacities themselves (e.g. as in dancing or running). The moving body 
also has its own force of expression, a distinct pattern to the way movement is 
enacted. 
Stern goes on to characterise the innumerable ‘dynamic forms’ through which 
vitality is expressed. For example, the feeling of ‘surging’ is distinct from that of 
‘floating’, which is different again from that of ‘halting’. As forms of experience, 
these terms mark very different ways in which the force of the body ‘goes 
somewhere’, lasting sometimes a few brief seconds, sometimes considerable 
longer. What Stern attempts to describe are the ‘felt experiences of force’ (p.8) 
that are involved in sensations of ‘being alive’. These cannot be partitioned into 
the existing psychological grammar of experience since vitality is ‘separate and 
distinct from the domains of emotion, sensation and cognition’ (p.149). For 
example, the experience of feeling a welling in the chest and throat that gives rise 
to an uncontrollable sobbing has its own very specific dynamic form that 
involves, at once, a range of sensations in the upper viscera, a rising and swelling 
emotion, and a rush of difficult-to-manage thoughts. But vitality itself - what it 
feels like to be alive, to be in the world at that moment - is irreducible to any of 
these psychological dimensions. It is what underpins them all and animates them 
in a dynamic orientation to the here and now - ‘vitality dynamics are thus crucial 
for fitting a living organism into the world that it encounters’ (p.15). 
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Drawing on clinical practice, Stern goes on to demonstrate the place of ‘dynamic 
forms of vitality’ in social relations. He argues for a phenomenon of ‘affect 
attunement’ where persons match the same dynamic form across different 
modalities, as in the following: 
A ten-month old girl is seated on the floor facing her mother. She is trying 
to get a piece of puzzle into its right place. After many failure she finally 
gets it. She then looks up into her mother’s face with delight and an 
explosion of enthusiasm. She ‘opens up her face’ [her mouth opens, her 
eyes widen, her eyebrows raise] and then closes back down. The time 
contour of these changes can be described as a smooth arch [a crescendo, 
high point, decrescendo]. At the same time her arms rise and fall at her 
sides. Mother responds by intoning, “Yeah” with a pitch line that rises 
and falls as the volume crescendos and decrescendos: “yeeAAAaahh”. The 
mother’s prosodic contour matches the child’s facial-kinetic contour. 
They also have the exact same duration.7 
The key to this example is that it is a kind of mirroring, but of the form of the 
other’s behaviour rather than its exact expression. More precisely, for Stern, it is 
a mirror of the dynamic pattern of expression - the same movement of crescendo 
and decrescendo with the same temporal unfolding - but crucially with a switch 
in modality (voice rather than facial expression). Stern argues that switching 
modality demonstrates an involvement and taking seriously of the other that 
avoids the appearance of simple repetition. Life responds to life by taking up its 
energy and transforming it into a new medium. Vitality is then not merely the 
expression of one individual body, but a co-ordination or ‘attuning’ of forces 
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(which can involve potential issues of ‘under’ or ‘over’ attuning when the co-
ordination misfires - e.g. the dynamic form is repeated in a way that is either 
underwhelming or completely excessive). 
Stern’s work identifies vitality as a distinct concept and suggests ways in which 
its expression might be described. But, in line with the clinical context in which 
the concept has been developed, much of Stern’s focus is on dyadic contexts 
rather than the broader social environment, coupled with an emphasis on the 
biological factors that are involved in ‘dynamic forms’. By contrast, Thomas 
Fuchs’ work points to the inherent relationality involved in vitality. Fuchs begins 
with a definition close to that of Stern of vitality as ‘the feeling of being alive: a 
pre-reflective, undirected bodily self-awareness that constitutes the unnoticed 
background of all intentional feeling, perceiving or acting’8. This definition is 
couched in phenomenological terms and draws attention to the centrality of 
body as the fundamental medium through which the world is experienced. 
Drawing on Heidegger, Fuchs posits that there are a number of ‘existential 
feelings’9 that constitute the background to any kind of elaborated experience. 
These correspond to what Heidegger called ‘stimmung’ or ‘mood’10. A mood is a 
form of background affect through which particular relations to the world are 
established. Fuchs describes these as including ‘elementary existential feelings’ 
such as ‘the feeling of being alive, of feeling oneself, at home in one’s body’11, 
’general existential feelings’ such as ‘states of feeling healthy, fresh, strong, or, on 
the other hand, tired, weak ill’ (p. 615), and ‘social existential feelings’ such as 
‘feeling at home in the world with others, feeling welcome, familiar, connected’ 
(p. 616).  
  8 
What all of these ‘existential feelings’ have in common is that they create an 
affective tone that sets out a relational map of the person’s felt place in the 
world. To feel ‘at home in one’s body’, for example, is primary to any particular 
sense of pleasure or health. It is, we might say, a direct experience of vitality that 
sets a kind of corporeal agenda for sensation. The person who finds themselves 
in such a mood is unlikely to be troubled by nagging feelings of incipient illness 
or of alien and threatening sensations within their body.  But for Heidgger 
‘stimmung’ or ‘mood’ is not reducible to a personal orientation. Mood is as much 
‘in’ the environment as it is ‘in’ the person (hence the term dasein or being-in-
the-world that Heidegger uses in place of a person-environment distinction). As 
Gumbrecht describes, the term stimmung draws in part on the idea of an 
instrument being ‘tuned’ to a particular melodic scale12. The person may then be 
said to be similarly ‘attuned’ to the atmosphere of the world around them. This 
operates at both the level of the fundamental ‘existential feelings’, such as the 
fundamental orientations in which persons find themselves, and in the more 
moment-to-moment affective relations that we experience, such as feelings that 
the mood in an audience has soured, or that the neighbourhood into which we 
have just arrived feels threatening.  
For Fuchs, the idea of affectivity as located within our attunement to the 
atmospheres in which we dwell relocates vitality outside of the narrow confines 
of the person as places it within the relationships we have to others and the 
broader world. But this relationship is dynamic - it is not a simple matter of 
‘picking up’ on feeling that come from elsewhere. Fuchs speaks of a ‘bodily 
resonance’ involved in attunement which ‘includes all kinds of local or general 
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bodily sensations: feelings of warmth or coldness, tickling or shivering, pain, 
tension or relaxation, constriction or expansion, sinking tumbling or lifting etc’13. 
Resonance acts as the ‘sounding board’ through which affectivity is felt. We do 
not feel sad, happy or indifferent, but rather crushed in the stomach by feelings 
of despair, giddy in our heads with elation, or cold and unfeeling across our skin 
with an unfathomable world. Resonance is both a medium for experiencing the 
world and at the same time a medium through which our feelings are expressed. 
Others then ‘act back’ on the resonances we express, a feedback cycle that Fuchs 
and Froese term ‘inter-bodily resonance’14. Whilst this term bears some 
resemblance to Stern’s notion of ‘affect attunement’, Fuchs and Froese go further 
in arguing that such resonances effectively create a higher-order unit of 
experience that they term an ‘extended body’. When we resonate with another, 
we form together a relational nexus that has, to some extent, its own distinct 
forms of vitality and existential feelings. 
Following Fuchs, we can now relocate vitality away from the confines of an 
individual body and place it into a broader relational context. We can also see 
how vitality underpins much of the existing psychological vocabulary. This has 
important implications of how we approach mental health. As Fuchs makes clear, 
‘embodied affectivity’ is a primary form of experience that underpins the kinds of 
phenomenon that fall under traditional diagnostic criterion15. If these are seen as 
fundamentally ‘shared states’ then the way in which mental health is approached 
must, as a consequence, be shifted towards a relational understanding of 
distress, rather than an individualistic model of personal pathology.  
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Both Stern and Fuchs provide a very rich means of describing vitality. But what 
of the ‘anti-life’ that was so important to Anne? Should this be seen as a ‘lack’ or 
vitality, or a form of ‘under-attunement’ to the world? This is not really 
satisfactory, since as Anne makes clear, what she is referring to is a force that 
degrades her own sense of vitality. Yet in trying to orient to this force, we are led 
towards a new version of the person-environment problem, where vitality 
comes from within, and that which opposes it comes from without. Is this the 
best way to conceptualise ‘life’ and ‘anti-life’, or is there perhaps a way of 
rendering that relationship in ways that undercut such a dualism? 
Critical Vitalism 
Frederic Worms is at the forefront of French philosophers working in what is 
commonly termed the ‘continental tradition’ (i.e. the body of thought that 
develops post-Kantian philosophy, where phenomenology and post-
structuralism are key moments). Worms is best known for his extended exegesis 
of the work of Henri Bergson16, which he has recently come to characterise as 
‘critical vitalism’17. Critical vitalism is a neologism that combines two distinct 
philosophical movements. Vitalism is a ‘philosophy of the organism’, which 
typically asserts the primacy of the category of ‘life itself’ as the central object of 
philosophical enquiry and the means through which a direct experience of the 
world may be enacted18. By contrast, ‘critical philosophy’ is the name given to 
Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy which seeks to found knowledge through a 
critique of the inadequacies in existing thought and establishing the proper 
limits in which reason may be applied to an always partial account of the world. 
These are clearly opposed traditions – life versus reason, experience unbounded 
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in organic movement versus experience tightly bounded to empirical self-
consciousness. The idea that they might be brought together in a single term is 
provocative, to say the least. 
The key to this apparent paradox is, Worms claims, to be found in Bergson’s 
work19. In Creative Evolution, Bergson developed a view of evolution as a process 
of life searching for ‘solutions’ that would allow the organism to overcome the 
difficulties in their environment20. For example, the eye is a solution to the 
problem of spatial relations in that it allows the organism to enter into relations 
that go beyond the immediate environment, thus extending the range of the 
organism’s ‘attention’. For Bergson, it becomes necessary to posit that organisms 
participate in a single category of being called ‘life’ in order to argue that 
evolution is not piecemeal process of gradual adaptation but rather a series of 
partial solutions to problems that are solved without any sense of a ‘final cause’ 
towards which evolution is proceeding. Life is the continuous, endless searching 
to overcome existing forms, a perpetual reaching for new solutions to changing 
problematics posed at the organic level. Bergson termed this vital force ‘élan 
vital’, which he placed at the very centre of his philosophical project (despite 
some 25 years elapsing before Bergson felt able to demonstrate how élan vital 
could ground an ethical system)21. Although Creative Evolution offers a highly 
speculative metaphysics, its influence on later figures such as George 
Canguilhem, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze is clear. All these thinkers take 
‘life’ to be a fundamental category of social and political thought, and to be 
central to any philosophical project that seeks to understand what constitutes 
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liberty when the very conditions of life and death are objects of governmental 
concern. 
Most scholars would see Creative Evolution as representing the apex of Bergson’s 
concerns with life, but Worms argues that in the earlier text Matter and Memory, 
a more nuanced account of vitalism is contained22. In this work, Bergson sets out 
an account of life as that which continually distorts contact with ‘reality’. In an 
inversion of the usual way in which psychological processes are described, 
Bergson reasons that perception is a means by which aspects of the world and 
‘cut out’ or reduced in order to provide the organism with a manageable foothold 
in the environment. Perception is a subtractive rather than additive process. 
What we perceive is a structured by our particular needs, which operate like a 
kind of searchlight shone into the environment, such that we only pick out that 
which is most immediately useful to us. Bergson places perception within a 
process he calls ‘attention to life’ - an expanded attention that extends our 
potential reach into the world, but at the risk of neglecting our needs, whereas a 
limited attention contains the opposite risk of ignoring relevant features of the 
environment (i.e. threats to our actions). 
The description of life in Matter and Memory seems, paradoxically, closer the 
limited and partial view of knowledge found in the Kantian tradition, such that it 
may appear that here Bergson is concerned with critique, whilst Creative 
Evolution takes forward vitalism. But Worms argues that this would be to neglect 
the ways in which the two texts in fact deal with the same paradox: 
We should, however, stress first, and very forcefully, what seems to us to 
be one of the major lessons of Matter and Memory … We cannot obtain 
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pure life, but we have to criticise the knowledge and power on or over 
life. But at the same time, we cannot forget that we are living and creating 
our lives through individual time and history. That we are leading a 
temporal, and durational life that builds … an individual body and brain, 
an individual memory and history, an individual (and one should add 
relational) past, present and future. Yes, even the present is not only the 
constraint of the action, but the peak of our creation, when it is pushed 
by our time and into our future23  
Worms here argues that life must inevitably confront the particular forms of 
power and knowledge in and through which it is manifest. To return to Stern and 
Fuchs, we have to consider how ‘life responds to life’, the ways in which it is 
relationally embedded in tensions between different and limiting expressions of 
forms of life. Thus the critical project of Kant, an evaluation of the modes of 
judgment and discernment through which life finds a foothold in the world is 
relevant here. But life only appears to be purely critical when we consider it in 
terms of present needs, with regard to the immediate ‘attention to life’ that the 
organism expresses, which is inevitably limited. The central lesson of Matter and 
Memory is to think in terms of duration - that is, to see our lives as unfolding in 
an indivisible temporal structure where the ‘present moment’ is an artificial 
construct. We are as much in the past as we are pointing towards the future that 
is in the process of coming to be. From this perspective, where we are right now 
is at the limit of a creative force that is surging to express itself as fully as is 
possible. Life is both the ultimate reality of vital force, and the critical and limited 
foothold in the world. There are two faces through which our experience is 
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necessarily structured. The tension between the critical and the vital is found 
within life itself. The question, for Worms and for Bergson, is then the extent to 
which this pluralist expression of life allows the organism to move forward, to 
find new and novel ways of relating to the world, or locks the organism into a 
more rigid and inflexible set of relationships. 
On this basis we can claim that the dualism of ‘life’ and ‘anti-life’ can be recast as 
a pluralism within life itself. We are at once beings who are necessarily restricted 
by the limited foothold in reality that comes from attention to the immediate 
conditions of existence, and beings who express broader dynamic forms of 
vitality that have a temporal structure linking our pasts and futures. Living is 
both dealing with the here and now that shows up in the affective relations in 
which we are currently entwined, and the broader sweep of our lives as efforts at 
expressing our capacities as embodied beings. It is the relation between these 
‘two faces’ of life - the ‘attention to life’ afforded by the immediate setting and the 
broader ‘rhythms of living’ that define our trajectories through these settings - 
that ought to concern us. 
Life and Space 
We now begin to turn from a broadly conceptual discussion towards the material 
contexts in which vitality is expressed. In doing so we are following the tension 
that Bergson identifies between life and its foothold in the world, and that 
Worms sees as at the heart of ‘critical vitalism’. If we have been concerned up to 
this point in describing how the dynamic forms that vitality takes, we now shift 
towards describing the spaces in which those forms relationally unfold and 
confront one another.  
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Gesler’s formulation of the concept of a ‘therapeutic landscape’ remains the 
dominant approach for understanding the relationship between vitality and 
space24. Gesler argues that certain kinds of places acquire a longstanding 
reputation as possessing the power to ‘heal’ or to positively impact on wellbeing 
(e.g. spas, forests, mountains). This effect may be either direct - such as through 
the supposed benefits of water, air or light - or indirect - such as via the sense of 
community and history which the place affords. A therapeutic landscape may 
then be considered in terms of its material, symbolic and social dimensions. In 
material terms, there is a rich body of literature that describes how ‘green’ and 
‘blue’ spaces support wellbeing by providing spaces for relaxation and stress 
reduction. For example, studies of the Japanese practice of Shinrin-yoku (‘forest 
walking’) have demonstrated a range of positive health benefits25. Similarly, 
positive effects have been demonstrated of ‘taking the water’26 and spending 
time near large bodies of water27. The principal benefit here seems to be the 
sense of tranquility that is afforded by viewing or contact with ‘blue space’. 
The symbolic dimensions of a therapeutic landscape arise from the enculturation 
of space within human activity. For example, the therapeutic benefits of visiting 
Lourdes in France come not just from the mineral water for which the site was 
originally known, but also from the symbolic association with miraculous 
appearances of the Virgin Mary, which have arisen over time28. In this way the 
symbolic may ‘laminate’ the material, serving as a framework of meaning that is 
overlaid on the physical properties of place. Meaning may also emerge through 
an individual relationship to space. As Jack describes, it is common for persons to 
have specific places that are experienced as symbolically rich (e.g. places visited 
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as a child, places where a particular event occurred)29. These ‘place attachments’ 
can facilitate wellbeing in the absence of any clear material effects through 
associations with past feelings and felt qualities (e.g. a place where one has 
previously felt ‘joyful’, ‘safe’ or ‘able to be oneself’). Places can also afford 
particular kinds of social activity - such as collective physical or recreational 
activity - that in turn promote association and a sense of belonging. In their 
different ways, forests, mountains and beaches can facilitate these kinds of 
socialised wellbeing effects. 
The concept of a therapeutic landscape disposes us to think of particular kinds of 
spaces as enhancing vitality. But as Moon et al argue, the converse also holds30. 
There are spaces, such as urban landscapes, impoverished housing 
developments or desolate rural environments that may undermine wellbeing, or 
even, in the case ‘spectral’ or ‘dark’ places, landscapes that are corrosive of 
wellbeing because of their material or symbolic properties (e.g. former asylum 
sites, places associated with catastrophe or specific tragedy). These tend to be 
under-researched in the therapeutic landscape tradition. Moreover, the very idea 
that a space necessarily gives rise to wellbeing for all visitors is problematic. It 
would be more apposite to observe that place often gives rise to a mixture of 
affects, both enabling and potentially disabling, in an unstable and changeable 
mixture. Former county asylum sites in the UK, for example, are often situated in 
pleasing ‘green spaces’ which can be associated with ‘retreat’ and ‘protection’ 
(i.e. one of the meanings of asylum). But they are also marked with a history of 
seclusion, a lack of liberty, and potential violence that can be experienced as a 
complex affective milieu with competing ‘tones’. Life responds to different forms 
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of life, to different affective tones of experience. Much also depends on how the 
engagement with place fits into a broader temporal and biographical trajectory. 
Rural places may serve as spaces of retreat and pleasure for those who pass 
through them ‘unmarked’, but as Agyeman shows, persons of colour can find that 
they are highly visible and potentially subjected to prejudice in ways that 
undermine any therapeutic sense of belonging or escape31. 
Vitality then needs to be relationally defined with respect to the properties of 
space and aspects of temporality. We should be concerned with specific forms of 
embodiment-in-place that become entwined within particular rhythms of living, 
as a person’s temporal trajectory is folded into that of the place. For example, a 
repeated trope in the writing of the novelist WG Sebald is the return of a 
character who is currently undergoing an episode of crisis to a place they knew 
earlier in life, only to discover that the space has changed almost beyond 
recognition, and the impossibility of recovering a felt sense of that past life32. 
Describing these complex sets of affectively charged relations requires a very 
different language, such as that provided by Cameron Duff33. In Assemblages of 
Health, Duff develops the concept of an ‘assemblage’, taken from Deleuze & 
Guattari34, as an analytic tool to study situated experiences of health within 
particular settings35. An ‘assemblage’ is a relational nexus of bodies, materials, 
affects and signs which are gathered into an ongoing process of ‘arranging’36. A 
key aspect of the term is that no prior distinction is made between either 
subjects or objects, or material or symbolic aspects. ‘Subjects’ and ‘qualities’ 
emerge from within the relational gathering rather than underpin its processual 
development (or ‘becoming’). For example, from an assemblage perspective, a 
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hospital ward is not a space where care is delivered to patients by staff, but 
instead an ongoing mixture of actions, feelings and utterances emerging between 
bodies and materials through which ‘subjectivities’ emerge. What constitutes 
‘care’ and ‘health’ are properties that are entirely relative to the assemblage 
itself. Brown & Reavey demonstrate the difference in perspective here by re-
describing life on a psychiatric unit in assemblage terms: 
The secure unit is complex and changeable arrangement of medical, legal 
and governmental practices, mixing together nurses, former prisoners, 
airlock doors, depot injections, charts, televisions, plastic cutlery, 
cigarettes, staff rotas, sunlight, and bedrooms littered with belongings. 
The unit can be a lively place, especially during times when patients 
arrive on transfer from prison, where the contradictory demands of care 
and containment can rub up against one another uneasily, notably 
around issues like personal relationships. The space of the unit is difficult 
to properly gauge, since patients may be allowed off the ward into the 
general hospital grounds and to make community visits; there is a 
distinctly different ‘feel’ to the common areas and the individual 
bedrooms, reflecting the various kinds of activities that are possible in 
each. Whilst there is a clear management structure, it is difficult to know 
where exactly the unit sits – are we in the prison system, the medical 
system or somewhere else entirely? This partial ambiguity allows for the 
emergence of practices and relationships that are particular to the unit, 
some of which would be difficult to understand if one approached the 
unit as either purely a space of containment or purely a space of 
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treatment. Everyone and everything that enters the unit lends something 
specific, from East African nurses to long-term service users to middle-
class psychiatrists mixed together in this space; this unique confluence of 
identities and experiences seems integral to how the place seems to 
‘work’ as whole. Yet precisely because it is such a mixture, the unit seems 
to be rather porous – people, practices and objects seem to be displaced, 
to move through and across the extended space of the unit in 
unpredictable ways. The place has its own history, one that seems to be 
written and rewritten on an almost daily basis.37 
This description emphasises the variety of elements that are in the process of 
being arranged, and the kinds of relationships and affects that emerge between 
them. Whilst the concept of assemblage is meant refer to a process of spatio-
temporal arranging, rather than a distinct space, a key aspect of this process is 
‘territorialisation’38. Territorialisation refers to an exchange of properties 
between what we might crudely call the discursive and non-discursive aspects of 
an assemblage39. For example, the act of diagnosing a person with a mental 
health disorder, such a ‘Personality Disorder’, does not just simply label that 
person or make them subject to a particular kind of service. It acts to ‘reorganise’ 
their embodied relations. The person is now recruited into a discourse where the 
expression of their feelings may be considered by others as ‘manipulation’, and 
where their efforts to describe their needs is seen to flow from a lack of concern 
for others. This inevitably transforms the person’s relation to their own 
embodied moods and sensations and, moreover, brings them into different sets 
of relations with other embodied practices. Guattari spoke of this as the creation 
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of a new ‘existential territory’ or a reshaping of the actual conditions of life40. For 
Duff, this means that we should ‘treat the lived experience of health and illness as 
a complex of affective and relational transitions within the various assemblages 
which express human life41. Or put different, vitality can be seen as what 
emerges from an assemblage, rather than as the underlying properties that are 
affected by an assemblage. 
Duff offers the concept of ‘enabling space’ 42as a corrective to the idea that health 
and place can be defined separately from one another43. Whilst this term 
captures the relational dimension of an assemblage perspective on space, we 
prefer the term ‘vital spaces’. We use this to refer to both the relational nexus of 
bodies, affects and materials that are assembled together in a specific setting 
(e.g. a hospital ward, a public space, a forest), and to the potential range of 
trajectories that may be recruited into these settings. Any space can be analysed 
with respect to how it shapes vitality, not simply those kinds of spaces typically 
studied as therapeutic landscapes. In this sense, vital space is a lens for 
addressing vitality ‘in the world’. It provides a focus on the tensions as ‘life 
confronts life’ within a specific material and discursive context. In the following 
two sections we will illustrate how the concept of vital space may be developed 
by considering the cases of inpatient and community based care for mental 
health. Our concern here will be the ground the issues raised in the conceptual 
discussions around vitality in the work Stern, Fuchs and Worms, and the trace 
our way back to Anne’s experience which served as the point of departure. 
Inpatient Mental Health Care as Vital Space 
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Our discussion here is predominately informed by work we have carried out in 
medium-secure forensic psychiatric settings44454647, but serves to illustrate 
similar issues found in other kinds of inpatient care. Being admitted to inpatient 
care can be an overwhelming experience for many patients, who are typically 
enduring an episode of mental health ‘crisis’. As described earlier, being 
admitted to such care involves being formally detained under a section of the UK 
Mental Health Act. There are a number of different kinds of ‘sections’, which 
specify the general length of inpatient care and the process for returning to the 
community. The most stringent are sections 37/41, otherwise known as ‘forensic 
sections’, which mandate care in a secure hospital setting rather than prison, and 
that the patient is deemed to be a risk to self, others or the environment. These 
sections make it explicit that the patient is a threat to their own vitality - the 
‘anti-life’ dimension comes from the person themselves rather than their 
environment. It is then the purpose of secure care to facilitate the person’s 
journey back to taking control of their own life and health, or ‘recovery’. For 
some patients this is greatly desired. It is now extremely difficult for persons 
struggling with mental health issues in the UK to access inpatient care, even 
during periods of crisis. But for others, especially those on forensic pathways, the 
loss of liberty following ‘being sectioned’, can be experienced as either a 
punishment or as  inexplicable. Not all patients see the hospital environment as a 
‘vital space’ on admission. 
Most inpatient wards in the UK are single-sex with individual bedrooms for use 
by around 15-20 patients. The decade long ‘austerity’ programme enacted by the 
Cameron and May Conservative governments has led to an overall reduction in 
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the number of beds available, meaning that every ward is normally operating at 
full capacity. Patients often view one another with a degree of suspicion, 
particularly on forensic pathways. Whilst the levels of violence between patients 
in inpatient mental health care does not differ significantly from that within the 
overall healthcare system, adjusting to the particular needs and forms of 
expression of other patients is an ongoing process. Patients are also not 
encouraged to develop friendships with one another since this is seen as 
involving risks, particular where there is a concern of a potential intimate 
relationship. In this latter case, explicit sanctions will occur and patients may be 
moved around the hospital to prevent further contact. If we consider vitality to 
be inherently relational, such that ‘feelings of being alive’ depend in part on how 
we interact with others, then this aspect of inpatient care is inherently ‘anti-life’. 
Having a private space is usually associated with being able to exert some 
control over personal activities. Bedrooms can act as a spaces of retreat from the 
ward. Patients often go to their bedrooms as kind of ‘time out’ from the noise and 
activity of the ward space when they feel it is becoming overwhelming. Much 
here turns on how the physical environment of the ward is defined. The older 
county asylums followed the Victorian principle of having large open spaces 
which allowed plenty of light and the circulation of air. By the mid-twentieth 
century, pressure on hospital space, particularly on urban sites, created more 
cramped ward space. Contemporary designs have turned back to the older 
model, where possible, and tend to utilise open spaces along with spaces 
dedicated to specific activities (e.g. outdoor spaces; recreational spaces; spaces 
for prayer/spirituality). But the limited footprint of the hospital means that 
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when patients are in their bedrooms, they are still exposed to the often 
cacophonous ‘soundscape’ of the ward, which can including shouting, loud 
televisions or music, the sound of keys jangling and heavy locked doors 
slamming. The extent to which bedroom space supports ‘forms of vitality’ is 
often determined by the acoustic atmosphere of the ward. Moreover, all patients 
are subject to regular monitoring, which in many cases can mean that staff 
physically enter their bedroom on an hourly basis during both night and day. 
Feelings of safety are then continuously undermined by the practice of 
surveillance. 
Outdoor spaces have become particularly important in modern psychiatric 
hospitals (again, this can be seen as a return back to older practices). There are a 
number of drivers for this, but within forensic pathways this is in part because 
legal restrictions on detention can mean that patients are not allowed outside 
the building. Constructing outdoor spaces within the unit is a way of ensuring 
that patients can access natural light and fresh air without violating the terms of 
their detention. The outdoor spaces usually feature plants and other ‘greenery’, 
and can sometime have gardens where patients are encouraged to become 
involved in growing flowers or vegetables. Fostering organic life through 
gardening or merely appreciating the natural world (i.e. ‘biophilia’) is normally 
thought to enhance individual vitality48. However, in our work we have found 
that many patients do not necessarily enjoy spending time in these ‘green 
spaces’. In some units, there is actually very little activity formally planned, with 
the result that patients become restless and prefer to go to their bedrooms. Some 
patients can feel that the green space symbolises their current lack of liberty and 
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is therefore a limit to their vitality, rather than an enhancement. Access to 
outdoor space is often limited to particular times during the day. A patients own 
‘rhythms’ of activity can be determined by how they respond to medication, with 
the consequence that their sleep/wakefulness does not map onto the structure of 
the day on the ward. The times when they would most benefit from being 
outside are sometimes not when access is available. 
Food is for many people a major source of vitality. Aside from the immediate 
pleasures of taste and satiation, eating provides an opportunity for sociality, for 
coming together around a pleasurable activity. We have found that when 
patients are asked to describe what they most desire for their life outside of 
hospital, along with having a ‘place of their own’, the ability to cook for 
themselves is without fail what is stated49. It is then unfortunate that the quality 
and provision of food in many inpatient units is greatly lacking. The pressures on 
funding in the National Health Service have led to a reduction in the amount 
spent per meal, per patient, and in the use of outsourcing, such that the majority 
of food is prepared outside the ward itself. Whilst individual dietary and calorific 
needs are met, food rarely inspires much by way of pleasure. Mealtimes are also 
a problematic time for staff. Disputes between patients about the food they have 
been served are common. There is also the risk that cutlery and plates can be 
‘weaponised’. The tendency is to have patients eat either alone or in small 
groups, and to curtail mealtimes as quickly as possible. Thus the social benefits 
and affective attunements of eating together are negated. On some units, there 
are small kitchens where patients can engage in supervised cooking. But the 
need to manage risk means that these activities are often not regular, and 
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require substantial planning and management by staff. The potentially life-
affirming aspect of feeding oneself (and others) becomes highly limited. 
In the discussion of intimate relationships and of food, we have begun to address 
the more sensuous aspects of vitality, the potential embodied pleasures of 
engaging with others and the world around us. This leads us towards an 
aesthetic dimension of life, or the ‘form-giving’ modes of vitality. We feel alive 
through the capacity to create forms through which vitality can be expressed. 
Within inpatient mental health care, there is a rich tradition of using art, drama 
and music as a means for patients to explore their feelings. Undoubtedly for 
some patients, there is a therapeutic gain from participation in these kinds of 
activities. However, Reavey et al found in a study with young people detained in 
a locked inpatient setting, that the programming of art based activities could 
have unanticipated consequences50. The participants described how they 
experienced art activities as a particular moment where they could ‘pour out’ 
their feelings. However, the structure of ward life meant that these activities 
were confined to a limited time. Afterwards, they returned back to the ward with 
the feelings that they had surfaced during the activity still ‘on their mind’, 
without any means of being able to address of manage them. As a result, some 
young people reported self-harming in their bedrooms following these art 
sessions. From the perspective of vitality, we can say that facilitating self-
expression without providing a framework for dealing with what emerges is, 
ultimately, corrosive of vitality. 
The examples we have given above have deliberately focused on some of the 
more problematic aspects of inpatient care. Nevertheless what they begin to 
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articulate is that vitality is not a unidimensional construct. It is rarely the case 
that some activity or aspect of the setting unilaterally supports or represses 
vitality, rather that there is a mixture of competing forces out of which vitality 
emerges. Analysing this tension between different relational aspects of the 
setting is crucial. We have also shown that much depends on the ways that 
persons pass through the setting. It really matters how someone comes to be 
sectioned, and where that trajectory is leading them when they are discharged 
from inpatient care. The rhythms of daily life, which can be highly individual, 
also matter greatly. The space itself is neither intrinsically ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in vital 
terms - everything depends on the capacity of the space to facilitate what may be 
required, when it is required. 
Community Mental Health Care as Vital Space 
The vast majority of mental health care occurs within community settings. This 
is a consequence of unusual convergence of social and economic drivers which 
have sought to reduce the stigma and loss of liberty associated with inpatient 
care whilst simultaneously driving down the costs associated with high intensity 
interventions. Persons who access mental health services in the community do 
so via local teams of nurses and clinicians, alongside other social welfare 
professionals. Many mental health service users continue to be in either full time 
or part time employment, or are engaged in voluntary work or study. This 
provides access to communities and settings that may be supportive of vitality, 
not least by providing purpose and social support. Service users who are not 
engaged in these activities may be in receipt of disability benefits, although there 
has been a progressive drive under the ‘austerity’ programme to assess 
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increasing numbers of persons with mental and physical health issues as ‘fit to 
work’, especially under the new ‘Universal Credit’ system.  
Ian Tucker’s work, dating from before the implementation of current austerity 
measures, describes the situation of service users who are not considered as ‘fit 
to work’51. One of the major issues is that of ‘filling the time’ in the absence of a 
work or study regime. Inevitably this means spending prolonged periods of time 
at home, either living independently or in supported housing. Tucker notes the 
tendency to ‘bulk out’ domestic space by filling it with goods and objects (e.g. 
food, bottles of drink, clothes, DVDs). The purpose of this ‘bulking’ appears to be 
to territorialise the space, that is to create a zone of meaning and purpose within 
the domestic environment. In particular, arranging objects for their symbolic 
rather than practical value (e.g. a chess set positioned in a central location) 
accomplishes a sense of materialising the process of recovery by expressing the 
person’s capacities (i.e. as someone who could engage in the skill of chess playing 
should they choose to do so). Territorialisation is both an expression of vitality, 
and a marking out of the spatial boundaries that can facilitate vital forms.  
The alternative to spending time at home is to visit a local day care or drop-in 
centre. These are spaces that provide care and support, through counselling and 
practical sessions aimed at developing skills for independent living, alongside art 
or music classes and ‘lunch clubs’. As Conradson describes, there can be a 
plurality of experiences as service users engage with the space in different 
ways52. From a vitality perspective, one common feature is that of promoting 
social interaction and ‘being listened to’. In this sense these centres may serve as 
short-term refuges from managing mental health issues in public. However, as 
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Smith & Tucker describe, inclusivity may be performed in variable ways, such 
that persons who visibly express distress (e.g. loud vocalisations, agitation, 
rocking movements), may be subject to stigmatisation or exclusion53. Not all 
forms of vitality are supported or encouraged. Increasingly centres of this kind 
are disappearing from the social landscape, under the twin pressures of reducing 
‘semi-institutionalised’ settings and the economic drive to ‘do more with less’. In 
their absence, some service-user led organisations have begun to emerge (e.g. 
The Dragon Cafe in central London), which provide spaces for mutual support 
focused around a social ‘third space’. The very fact that the parameters of the 
space have been defined by service users rather than as institutional 
mechanisms for care delivery render these existential territories as more apt to 
enhance vitality. 
McGrath & Reavey refer to the kind of care delivery that has increasing replaced 
day centres as ‘helicopter services’54. Here healthcare professionals, such a 
Community Psychiatric Nurses (CPN) or clinicians, appear briefly in the lives of 
service users - perhaps a five minute consultation with a psychiatrist once a 
month, or a half-hour conversation with a CPN in a pub - to perform a monitoring 
activity, before disappearing. For service users, this brief interaction can be 
problematic because they are encouraged to gather up their feelings and 
experiences consequent to the previous interaction and rapidly report them. 
This requires performing a very particular vitality form - a kind of rapid 
emotional outpouring followed by ‘zipping up’ feelings such that the service user 
can now return back into public space. As, Julie, one of McGrath and Reavey’s 
participants put it - ‘The other problem with sitting in a pub … is that if you get 
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upset about anything … you can’t really be in tears in a pub without everybody 
going (whispers) what’s going on there so you tend to kind of put on your social 
face’ (p. 65-66). The problem here is that whilst helicopter services may provide 
a ‘bridging function’, they encourage the expression of vitality forms that they 
are not then able to manage. There is a similar issue of managing vitality 
amongst Duff’s participants55. One of the solutions they adopt is to keep moving 
through the urban environment. Rather than focus their efforts at sociality in one 
place, the participants describe a process of ‘learning to be social’ through 
practices such as taking long train journeys where they can observe other 
people’s behaviour or using hair salons or supermarkets as sites to experiment 
with interactions with others. It is the movement through these spaces, they 
ways they connect up with the broader activities of the day that appear critical 
here. 
The vitality perspective draws attention to the ways in which spaces connect 
with one another through the activity of service users passing through the 
spaces. The sense of ‘feeling alive’ is not associated directly with just one space, 
but rather in the patterns of movement involved in making transitions between 
space. Home, for example, can be a place of refuge, on the condition that there is 
a separate space where socialising can occur (e.g. day centre)56. Conversely 
spaces that might thought of as facilitating vitality, such as cafes or pubs, can 
become problematic when forms of vitality are elicited there that become 
difficult to subsequently contain. An exploration of how public and private 
spaces can be joined together into patterns of activity becomes important. For 
example, Duff describes how his participant Matt would take walks around the 
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city at 3AM57. For Matt, the streets felt safe at this time, with the manic energy of 
the daytime city now absent. His ability to move through the streets unimpeded 
in the early hours created a novel form of vitality. 
Vital Space: A Research Agenda 
In this paper we have explored the promise of vitality as an alternative 
framework for engaging with lived experiences of mental health. This has taken 
us on a journey through contemporary work in the vitalist tradition, which 
provides a rich vocabulary for describing the tensions at the heart of forms of 
vitality, the conflicts that emerge as ‘life confronts life’. In doing so, we have 
passed from the conceptual to the empirical, from life itself to the footholds in 
time and space wherein the vital is expressed. In particular, we have focused on 
inpatient and community care as the two overarching contexts in which lived 
experiences of mental health are enacted. In this concluding section we return 
our point of departure by offering some brief reflections on vitality can be 
operationalized as a research agenda in which to understand and articulate lived 
experiences of mental health, such as those described by Anne. 
We began with Anne’s description of her time on a secure unit as being in an 
‘anti-life’ environment. In this sense, we may be tempted to distinguish between 
those spaces that support vitality and those that are corrosive of it. However, as 
the argument has developed it has become clear that space is rarely experienced 
in a unitary way - there are a plurality of potential experiences for any given 
space, which, moreover may change as a function of the activities that unfold 
within the space. Already in Anne’s description, there was the sense that how 
one engages with the space is crucial to experiences of ‘feeling alive’. In her case, 
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Anne had chosen to ‘cope’ with the environment by drawing out those aspects 
that could make ‘living’ into a specific kind of manageable ‘reality’. 
Viewing Anne’s experiences through the lens of vitality rather than that of 
mental health offers a very specific gain. We share the unease expressed within 
much of the service-user movement and by Critical Psychology in the rigid 
application of diagnostic psychiatric categories58. It feels to us that these 
categories often overlook fundamental questions about the kinds of life that 
persons who use mental health services are living and on the broader trajectory 
of their lived experience. As Dillon states, rather than ask people what is what is 
wrong with them, we should ask instead what has happened to them (and also 
what they want to happen in their future)59. Because vitality cuts across 
distinctions between cognition, emotion and sensation, it draws attention to the 
actual embodied conditions of living. However, as Fuchs demonstrates, bodies 
should not be considered in isolation from one another, but rather with respect 
to their relations and the kinds of attunements and resonances that occur 
between bodies. As Stern argues, movement is the principal property of ‘being 
alive’. Vitality is felt and expressed through the ways that we move in relation to 
one another and in the ways that we move through space. Rather than ask of a 
given space ‘what are its properties?’, we should instead ask ‘how does it feel to 
move within and through this space?’. 
There is a now a rich body of work that describes space in relational terms60. To 
do so is to think of the space of human activity not as a particular measurable 
area in which something occurs and is contained, but rather to think of relations 
between bodies and materials as creating their own specific spatiotemporal 
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forms61. As we showed in the example of the hospital ward, what counts as a 
particular space is constituted through ongoing interplay between forces and 
relations. The notion of assemblage is fruitful here because it refuses to reify 
distinctions between the different kinds of relations that are in play in advance. 
It focuses attention instead on the interactional processes between bodies and 
materials. A space is not then vital or anti-life in advance, but can rather shift 
between these poles according to how relations unfold within the assemblage. 
As Worms shows, there is also a fundamental tension within the concept of 
vitality. We must engage in specific kinds of activities to be able to live at all. This 
is what Bergson terms ‘attention to life’. These would include routine 
maintenance activities (e.g. sustenance, sleep, exercise, shelter) and efforts at 
marking out and establishing our place in the world (i.e. ‘territorialisation’). One 
face of life is then concerned with making distinctions and demarcations, 
separating ourselves to some degree from the broader world. The other is 
constituted by the ‘rhythms of living’, the temporal trajectory of our experience 
as it expressed in ‘forms of vitality’. Here it is openness, change and the 
modulation of our embodied experience that is key. For Worms, vitality is what 
emerges from the tension between these two faces. Hence, not only are our 
experiences of space likely to be plural, but the very sense of what it means to be 
alive is also pluralised as our lives unfold. 
We then propose four elements to the analytic framework of viewing any space 
in terms of vitality: 
-The first is the study of the relations within an assemblage (e.g. a hospital ward, 
a public park, an individual home). Here we are concerned with identifying the 
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various bodies and materials within a setting and the ways in which they are 
‘attuned’ with one another, the kinds of activities that are involved, the patterns 
of movement with the loose boundaries of the space and so on.  
-Second, analysis of the ways that the assembled relations that make up a given 
space can be folded into another space as persons move between settings (e.g. 
admission or discharge from a ward, the times of day when persons walk the 
streets or a park, the ongoing process of making a space ‘homely’) and the ways 
these movements fit within their broader temporal trajectory. The same space 
may give rise to very different emergent ‘forms of vitality’ depending on the 
place it has in a person’s life and their ‘rhythms of living’. 
-Third, a concern with the practices of ‘territorialisation’ where persons mark 
out the boundaries of their ‘existential territories’, whether that be a home, a 
bedroom in a hospital, or the provisional space they temporarily occupy in a 
street or a park. This takes material along with symbolic form, involving the 
arranging of materials along with discourses. 
And fourth, the ways in which space is transformed and opened up through 
activity or ‘deterritorialised’. This is akin to inventing a new kind of space or 
expressing novel ‘forms of vitality’ through finding different resonances between 
bodies. For instance, the discovery that it is possible to briefly retreat from the 
ward through listening to music, or of turning the city into a new landscape by 
experiencing it at night, or creating a new community through service user led 
initiatives. 
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The agenda that we call for is one where mental health is no longer seen through 
the narrow perspective of diagnosis, or with respect to the specific spaces where 
services are provided. Through the lens of vitality, we want to explore how the 
most varied of public and private spaces can support feelings of being alive. In so 
doing we hope to go beyond the restricted sense of ‘care in the community’ to 
think instead about what spaces and communities of vitality might offer to 
mental health. 
Patient and Public Involvement 
This paper does not report new data. Please refer to original works cited for 
further details on PPI. 
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